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ABSTRACT 
THE RELATION BETWEEN ANGER RUMINATION, PROVOCATION,  
AND AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 
by Joshua Stephen Bullock 
December 2010 
Maladaptive, excessive anger rumination, conceptualized as self-focused attention 
towards thoughts and feelings associated with the emotion of anger, has been linked to 
actual aggressive behaviors. In general, the emotional experience of anger in response to 
provocation is a well-known antecedent of aggression. Anger rumination may be 
associated with increased risk for aggressive behavior by maintaining and lengthening the 
experience of anger. It is therefore reasonable to posit that individuals high in anger 
rumination may be more inclined to expend greater effort to aggress in response to 
provocation compared to low ruminators. That is, high ruminators when angered may be 
more likely to perseverate at an effortful task required to gain access to an aggressive 
response compared to low-ruminators. Accordingly, the aim of this study was to test the 
notion that anger rumination is positively associated with a propensity to expend greater 
effort to aggress in response to provocation. Men and women (N = 123) participants 
interacted with an increasingly provocative fictitious opponent during a competitive 
reaction time game during which electric shock was administered and received. 
Aggressive behavior was defined in two ways: The mean level of shock selected and the 
total number of supposedly harmful shocks selected. Participants were assigned to one of 
two effort conditions. Specifically, half were be assigned to a low-effort condition in 
which all shock levels required minimal and equal effort to access. The other half were 
iii 
 
assigned to a high-effort condition in which access to relatively greater levels of 
aggressive responding required engaging in an increasingly effortful task (i.e., a series of 
greater and greater button-presses to access respectively more intense shock levels). 
Before the task, anger rumination was elicited by having the “opponent” denigrate the 
participant through the use of false feedback on an ostensible measure of intelligence. 
After the task, dispositional anger rumination and trait anger were assessed using self- 
report measures. It was hypothesized that:  requiring effortful responding would decrease 
aggressive behavior overall; anger rumination (controlling for trait anger) would be 
uniquely associated with aggressive behavior following provocation in the high-effort 
condition due to the continued activation of aggression-maintaining affect and cognitions 
(that is, participants high in trait rumination would be more motivated to respond 
aggressively when provoked and expend greater effort to aggress); and trait anger would 
be associated  with aggression primarily in the low-effort condition controlling for anger 
rumination. Only hypothesis 1 was fully supported: requiring significant effort in order to 
aggress decreased the mean shock selected even at high levels of provocation, trait anger, 
and anger rumination. Anger rumination was found to be predictive of aggression; 
however no relationship emerged with effort condition. Trait anger was not significantly 
predictive of aggressive behavior. The lack of support for hypotheses 2 and 3 suggests 
that the aggression-dampening effects of the high-effort condition may override the 
aggression-promoting qualities of anger rumination. Future research could apply this 
finding to other moderating variables (such as impulsive aggression vs. instrumental 
aggression) to determine if the effects generalize to those groups. A future study could 
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also explore what aspects of the effort manipulation are responsible for the decreases in 
aggression noted in this study.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Rumination is a complex behavior that has been shown to influence numerous 
psychological phenomena (e.g., executive functioning, depression, aggression, and social 
anxiety). Although aggression has been experimentally linked to anger rumination (e.g., 
Borders, Barnwell & Earleywine, 2007; Vasquez, Bartsch, Pedersen, & Miller, 2007) the 
processes responsible are not known. One possible explanation for this relationship is the 
perseverative, anger-maintaining nature of ruminative thought. The goal of this study is 
to examine the relationship between anger rumination, provocation, and the motivation to 
engage in aggressive behavior using a modified version of a well-validated laboratory 
measure of aggression: the Taylor Aggression Paradigm (Taylor, 1967). In this paper, a 
brief review of emotions and anger will be discussed. Next, rumination and its correlates, 
as well as aggression and provocation, will be described. This will lead to an examination 
of the impact of rumination on aggression followed by the rationale for this study. 
Background 
Angry Emotions 
 A number of different definitions for emotion as well as theoretical models for the 
genesis of specific emotions have been proposed. The Cognitive-Motivational-Relational 
theory (Lazarus, 1991), for example, holds that emotions have “a clear, personally 
significant, relational content, an appraisal of personal harm, threat, challenge, or benefit, 
the potential for action readiness, and physiological changes” (Lazarus, 1991 p. 820). 
Thus, if an individual perceives a situation as harmful or threatening, and also 
  
 
 
2
experiences a sense of physiological arousal, the resulting emotional response will be 
expressed as anger.  
In his neo-associationist model of anger, Berkowitz (1990) also identifies the 
importance of cognition in the activation of anger; however, this theory puts greater 
emphasis on the importance of negative affect. In Berkowitz’s model, negative affect 
primes anger or aggression related memories and ideas, leading to angry or aggressive 
responding. This contrasts with Lazarus’ theory of emotion, in that the complex thoughts 
and attributions thought to lead to anger are not initially present in anger-provoking 
situations. Instead, a more automatic associative process between a network of thoughts 
and feelings related to anger, aggression, and negative affect leads to an angry reaction. 
Only after this initial response do higher cognitive processes become influential.  
In order to support his theory, Berkowitz reviews research in which women were 
put into physically uncomfortable positions and asked to rate attitudes toward their 
mothers, significant others, and acquaintances (Monteith, Berkowitz, Kruglanski, & 
Blair, 1990). There was a significant effect of the discomfort manipulation, which 
resulted in increased negative affect, on participants’ self-reported anger and irritation. 
Effects on the attitudes they espoused about their significant others and acquaintances 
were also noted. Participants who experienced greater discomfort reported more anger 
and irritation in general and reported more specific anger toward significant others and 
acquaintances, although not toward their mothers. This finding lends credence to the idea 
that negative affect alone is capable of priming anger. This idea is important in 
understanding the role ruminative thought plays in maintaining anger and aggression. 
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Rumination 
There is a body of research suggesting that persistent negative affect can 
ultimately promote negative outcomes such as aggression or depression (Bushman, 
Bonachi, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). Rumination is 
thought to play a central role in the relationship between emotions and behaviors by 
maintaining the activation of negative emotions after they typically would have 
dissipated. Rumination has been defined as “…self-focused attention towards one’s own 
thoughts and feelings” (Bushman et al., 2005 p. 970). Rumination has been hypothesized 
to function as a coping or problem-solving mechanism, although not an effective one 
(Watkins & Moulds, 2005). This is because rumination tends to be more abstract than 
concrete. This means that the content of ruminative thought deals more with nonspecific, 
global themes and ideas. In contrast, non-ruminative problem solving is geared to specific 
problems and situations. For example, after receiving a poor grade, a ruminator might 
think, “I’m a failure academically;” whereas a non-ruminator might think, “I’ve done 
poorly on this one test.” Thus, because of its failure to concretely address specific 
problems, ruminative thought is not an effective means of problem solving.  
Some individuals are more likely than others to engage in rumination instead of 
more effective coping behaviors (Collins & Bell, 1997). Thus the tendency to ruminate 
has been conceptualized as trait-like in nature and existing along a continuum. High-
rumination individuals are more apt to introspect on thoughts and feelings associated with 
anger or sadness and low-rumination individuals are more apt to allow these emotions to 
dissipate (Collins & Bell, 1997).  
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Research has implicated rumination as playing a role in such diverse phenomena 
as maladaptive romantic jealousy (Carson & Cupach, 2000), depression (Crane, 
Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997; Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Morrow, 1991; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), displaced aggression 
(Bushman et al., 2005), and athlete aggression (Maxwell, 2004). The largest body of 
research has focused on rumination on depressive thoughts and rumination on anger. 
Although these two types of rumination both involve self-focused, repetitive thought, 
there are indications that anger rumination and depressive rumination exist as separate 
constructs with distinct negative consequences (Peled & Moretti, 2007). In both cases, 
however, ruminative thought can lead to the deepening of either anger or depression 
largely because of its circular nature. In anger rumination, for example, the original 
trigger of the angry mood is rehearsed repeatedly, fueling the angry mood leading to 
further rumination (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). That is, because negative affect 
provokes rumination and rumination maintains negative affect, ruminative thought has a 
tendency to perpetuate itself. 
Factors Affecting Rumination 
Many circumstantial and demographic factors can provoke or inhibit ruminative 
thought. In high-rumination individuals, rumination typically occurs in response to an 
event or situation that promotes negative affect, especially those situations that involve 
important, blocked goals (Borders, Barnwell, & Earleywine, 2007). Blocked goals can be 
related to both external events (e.g., ruminating on specific blocked goals or problems) 
and internal events (e.g., self-criticism or feelings of worthlessness; Watkins & Moulds, 
2005).  
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Some gender differences have been observed in rumination. In the case of anger 
rumination, men have been shown to ruminate more about an anger provoking stimulus if 
they are told they will be able to retaliate against the source of that provocation 
(Knoblock-Westerwick & Alter, 2006). Women, conversely, may engage in activities to 
dissipate their anger when told that they would be able to retaliate in the future 
(Knoblock-Westerwick & Alter, 2006). It has been theorized that, because men are 
culturally expected to aggress against their provokers, they ruminate to maintain angry 
feelings until the opportunity to aggress arises. Women, in contrast, are expected not to 
aggress in response to provocation, and thus dissipate to avoid having to do so. In 
contrast, rumination on depressive thoughts and triggers appears to be more common and 
intense in women than it is in men (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).  
Factors that decrease, dissipate, or resolve ruminative thought include distraction 
(Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), and reframing (i.e., viewing the rumination-
promoting situation from a different perspective; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross 2008). In 
support of the notion that distraction and reframing dissipate rumination, laboratory 
research has suggested that an expressive writing paradigm is effective at dissipating the 
negative effects of rumination (Sloan, Marx, Epstein, & Dobbs, 2008). Ironically, 
attempting to actively suppress thoughts of anger or sadness actually increases 
rumination on these thoughts (Miller, Pederson, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003).  
Why Ruminate? 
Some research has been conducted on the reasons individuals ruminate. Watkins 
and Baracaia (2001) explored the reasons for rumination in dysphoric ruminators using 
both qualitative and quantitative methods. Tendency to ruminate was positively 
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correlated with tendency to identify positive benefits to ruminative thought. The most 
commonly cited perceived positive benefits involved using ruminative thoughts to better 
understand one’s problems or situation. In open-ended interviews and measures, even 
high ruminators identified negative aspects of rumination as well as positive, indicating 
some ambivalence toward ruminative thoughts. 
A similar study of metacognition related to ruminative thought found that angry 
ruminators often held a combination of both positive and negative beliefs about their own 
rumination (Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003). Common negative beliefs among trait 
ruminators about anger rumination focus on concerns that ruminative thoughts prolonged 
anger, whereas positive beliefs included hopes that their ruminative thoughts would 
prepare them for future conflict or provide some form of emotional release (Simpson & 
Papageorgiou, 2003).  
Eliciting and Measuring Rumination 
 In non-ruminators, angry feelings have been shown to typically dissipate 
approximately 10 minutes after the occurrence of an anger-provoking event in the 
laboratory (Denson, Miller, & Pederson, 2006). However, these feelings can be 
prolonged even in non-ruminators. A number of procedures have been designed to elicit 
rumination in laboratory studies. One common method of inducing rumination in 
research participants is to ask them to write about or think about specific anger or sadness 
eliciting situations (Bushman et al., 2005; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008).  
 Several different scales have been developed to measure rumination. These scales 
are typically self-report measures of ruminative cognition. The Ruminative Response 
Scale (RRS) and the Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS) are commonly used measures 
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of depressive rumination (Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). Both scales 
were shown to have very good internal consistency and moderate test-retest stability. 
Evidence of construct validity was established for both scales through modest significant 
correlations between rumination scores and scores on measures of negative affect.  
 Anger rumination can be measured using the rumination subscale of the 
Displaced Aggression Questionnaire (DAQ; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). This 
questionnaire has been shown to distinguish between rumination in general and anger-
specific rumination (Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). The DAQ has also been shown 
to have high levels of internal consistency (α = .95) and test-retest stability. The DAQ 
was validated by correlating it with other measures aggression and rumination as well as 
through experimental studies in displaced aggression (Denson, Miller, & Pederson, 
2006).  
The Dissipation-Rumination scale (Caprara, 1986) is a 20-item measure of anger 
rumination. It is an adequately reliable measure of rumination, and has been shown to 
predict aggressive behavior in a laboratory setting.  A similar measure is the Anger 
Rumination Scale (ARS; Sukhodolsky, Golub & Cromwell, 2001), which is a 19-item 
measure of rumination on anger. The scale focuses on a general pattern of ruminative 
cognition rather than rumination on a specific anger-provoking event. The ARS has 
adequate internal consistency and test-retest consistency (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). Its 
validity was demonstrated through correlations with measures of related characteristics 
(e.g., trait anger, negative affectivity). In sum, a variety of well-validated measures exist 
to examine both dysphoric and anger rumination. 
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The Relationship of Rumination to Anxiety and Depression 
Depressive rumination has been found to lead to longer-lasting and more serious 
depressive symptoms (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007). In a study examining the 
emotional effects of a natural disaster, individuals who ruminated to cope with depressive 
symptoms were more likely to remain depressed both several days and several weeks 
after the earthquake (Nolen-Hoeksema, & Morrow, 1991). In another study, rumination 
directly preceding and during the death of a loved one was associated with poorer 
adjustment and longer lasting bereavement (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson 
(1997). 
Rumination and worry are “closely allied cognitive processes” (Hong, 2007, p. 
286), but appear to differ in specific and important ways. A common conceptualization of 
the difference between the two constructs depicts rumination as a persistent focus on past 
events whereas worry is viewed as a persistent focus on future events (Hong, 2007). 
Hong also identifies a number of other similarities and distinguishing factors. Worry is 
correlated with both depressive and anxious symptoms, whereas rumination correlates 
exclusively with depressive symptoms (Hong 2007). 
 Although distinct from the worry associated with most anxiety disorders, 
rumination does appear to play a specific role in social anxiety, wherein it is viewed as a 
component of “post-event processing” (PEP; Kocovski & Rector, 2007, p. 112). In PEP, 
rumination about a recent social interaction occurs in socially anxious individuals 
following the event. This rumination is theorized to help maintain the fear of social 
interactions in social phobia by affecting the formation of memories of prior social 
events. Residual negative affect from the social situation becomes associated with 
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memories of the event formed during PEP. The resulting memories are “dominated by 
negative self-perception” (Clark & Wells, 1995, p. 75). An experimental study examining 
the relationship between ruminative self-focus and social anxiety suggests that 
rumination does indeed exacerbate social anxiety symptoms (Vassilopoulos, 2008). In 
this study, participants who reported both low and high social anxiety were assigned to 
complete a task that either required them to ruminate analytically (i.e., thinking about 
specific symptoms or events) or experientially (i.e., thinking about more general bodily 
sensations). Self-report ratings of social anxiety symptoms were obtained following task 
completion. Ruminative thought on social anxiety worsened symptoms only in the 
evaluative, analytic thought condition. In contrast, non-analytical, experiential thinking 
about symptoms actually led to a reduction in social anxiety symptoms. This finding 
suggests that the analytical and self-evaluative components of ruminative thought may be 
particularly responsible for its deleterious effects in social anxiety.  
The Relationship of Rumination to Cognitive Functioning 
  Rumination has also been associated with cognitive inflexibility. In one research 
study, trait-ruminators were found to make significantly more perseverative errors on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task than did non-ruminators. Moreover, ruminators appeared to 
have difficulty adjusting to changes in the environment compared to non-ruminators 
(Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). A recent study explored the relationship between 
rumination and executive functioning using a Stroop Task. The Stroop Task is an 
interference task in which participants must “inhibit or override the tendency to produce a 
more dominant or automatic response” (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008, p. 222). Results 
indicated that rumination did inhibit executive functioning, but only in dysphoric 
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individuals. Specifically, induced rumination was found to impair inhibition, but, in 
contrast with Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema, (2000) induced ruminative thought alone did 
not have a significant effect on flexibility as measured by the Stroop task. It was found 
that the presence of dysphoria in general did have an impairing effect on cognitive 
flexibility. 
In another study examining depressive rumination and executive functioning, 
depressed participants underwent either a rumination induction manipulation or a 
distraction manipulation and were then required to perform a random number generation 
task that involved executive functioning. Depressed participants had trouble with the 
random number generation task while ruminating, whereas non-depressed ruminators did 
not. Both depressed and non-depressed participants in the distraction groups did not 
display executive functioning problems. This finding suggested that, in depressed 
individuals, rumination appears to dampen executive functioning (Watkins & Brown, 
2002).  
Ruminative self-focus has also been associated with difficulties in solving social 
problems (Watkins & Moulds, 2005), but only when the rumination was abstract in 
nature (i.e., more conceptual or generalized). Conversely, self-focused rumination on 
concrete scenarios or situations appeared to improve, rather than inhibit problem solving. 
This finding implicates the abstract nature of ruminative self-focus as being responsible 
for the problem solving deficits noted in some ruminators. While there is considerable 
evidence that rumination adversely affects executive functioning and problem solving, 
much of the research in this area has focused on rumination on depressive symptoms. It 
remains unclear as to whether angry ruminators display the same deficiencies.  
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Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been used to examine the 
neurobiology of emotional processing in depressed individuals. In one such study, 
depressed and euthymic individuals were exposed to personally relevant negative 
emotional prompts while their brain function was observed via fMRI (Siegle, Steinhaur, 
Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). Depressed participants displayed longer-lasting 
activation of the amygdala than did control participants. This long lasting activation 
coincided with self-reported rumination (Siegle et al., 2002), suggesting that problems 
with amygdalar inhibition may play a role in depressive rumination.  
The Relationship of Rumination to Physiology 
 Ruminative thought has been experimentally associated with cardiovascular 
symptoms. Blood pressure and pulse rate have been observed to increase following 
emotional provocations (Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002). Typically these 
physiological symptoms return to baseline following the removal of the emotional 
stressor. However, in individuals induced to ruminate on the stressor, the return to 
baseline was slower and both systolic and diastolic blood pressure remained higher than 
in individuals who did not ruminate. This delayed return to baseline blood pressure may 
increase the risk for future cardiovascular disease (Glynn et al., 2002).  
These effects have also been observed with rumination on events that occurred 
weeks or months prior. In another study exploring rumination and cardiovascular 
symptoms, women were asked to recall an unresolved anger-provoking event and then 
either engage in a distracting task or sit quietly for a period of time. Participants in the 
distraction condition ruminated less than those in the quiet-sitting group. Participants who 
self-distracted displayed a quicker return to baseline than did participants who ruminated, 
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further supporting the connection between rumination and cardiovascular symptoms 
(Neumann, Waldstein, Sollers, Thayer, & Sorkin, 2004). Finally, research has indicated 
that rumination acts as a moderator between blood pressure and personality variables 
such as avoidance and assertion (Hogan & Linden, 2004).  
Aggression and Its Antecedents 
 Rumination has been associated with aggression in several research studies, and 
this relationship is central to the current study. Before discussing this relationship, 
aggression in general must be discussed. Aggression has been defined as “any behavior 
directed toward another individual that is carried out with the immediate intent to cause 
harm” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 28). Aggressive behavior ranges in severity from 
milder examples such as verbal insults or hurtful gossip to lethal physical violence. 
Aggression can further be subdivided into proactive and reactive types. Proactive or 
“cold blooded” aggression refers to using aggressive behavior in order to achieve goals, 
such as using physical violence to intimidate a rival. Conversely, reactive aggression is 
more impulsive and emotional in nature, and occurs in response to threats or provocations 
(Brendgen, Vitaro, Boivin, Dionne, & Perusse, 2006).  
Numerous factors contribute to the likelihood that a given individual will engage 
in aggressive behavior. These include social learning variables, cognitive variables, 
personality variables, and provocation (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Situational factors 
that can provoke aggressive behavior include frustration (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), 
and unpleasant environmental factors such as physical pain or discomfort, high 
temperatures, or sensory factors such as loud noise (Berkowitz, 1993). Social learning 
through the modeling of aggressive behavior can also contribute to engagement in future 
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aggressive behavior (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Alcohol consumption has also been 
associated with aggressive behavior and, although the mechanism is not fully understood, 
it likely involves the disinhibiting effect of alcohol intoxication (McCloskey & Berman, 
2003). A number of personality factors besides trait rumination have been implicated in 
aggressive behavior. These factors include trait anger, narcissism, neuroticism, and low 
self-esteem (Bettencourt, Talley, Valentine, & Benjamin, 2006; Kingsbury, 1978). 
Deficits in executive functioning have also been associated with aggressive behavior, by 
mediating the relationship between temperament and physical aggression (Giancola, 
Roth, & Parrot, 2006). 
Aggression and Provocation 
Provocations are another important contributing factor to aggressive behavior, 
particularly reactive aggressive behavior (Bettencourt et al., 2006). In experimental 
research on provocations and aggression, adults and children competing against a 
fictitious opponent received increasingly high levels of electric shock and retaliated in 
kind (Chermack, Berman, & Taylor, 1997). This method of provocation has been 
effective in a number of other studies using the same paradigm (McCloskey & Berman, 
2003; Giancola, 2004). A similar relationship between provocation and aggression was 
confirmed in children using a laboratory paradigm for measuring aggression (Stadler, 
Rohrmann, Steuber, & Poustka, 2006). Provocation was also found to increase anger in 
the children examined in this study.  
Aggression following provocation has been found to be different than aggression 
under neutral conditions. The presence of provocation appears to alter the relationship 
between personality variables and aggressive behavior. Neuroticism, a personality 
  
 
 
14
variable that has been linked to aggressive behavior, appears to increase aggressive 
responding only under provocative conditions. In a condition without provocation, 
neuroticism appears to have little effect on aggression (Bettencourt et al, 2006). 
Provocation has also been illustrated to moderate the effects of gender on aggression. 
Bettencourt and Miller’s meta-analysis on gender differences in aggression (1996) cites 
the finding that men are generally found to be more aggressive than women according to 
the available paradigms measuring aggression. However, this difference almost 
disappears in conditions wherein participants are provoked before aggressing. 
The Relation of Rumination to Anger and Aggression 
A number of studies have implicated anger rumination as playing a significant 
role in aggression, particularly in the phenomenon of displaced aggression. For example, 
research participants induced to ruminate on a major insult were found to respond with 
greater aggression to a later, more minor provocation (Bushman et al., 2005). This effect 
persisted even 8 hours later. In another study, a writing paradigm was used to induce 
ruminative thought following a major insult. Following rumination, the level of displaced 
aggression displayed by participants was then measured. This study further confirmed the 
relationship between rumination and aggression, indicating that anger rumination 
contributed significantly to displaced aggression (Denson, Pedersen, & Miller 2006).  
In a recent exploration of rumination and displaced aggression, Vasquez and 
colleagues (2007) applied the displaced aggression model to a prison-sentencing task. 
Participants watched a 60-second clip of a violent bank robbery and were asked to either 
ruminate by writing an essay about the specifics of the video, or to self-distract by 
completing unrelated questionnaires. Participants were then either frustrated through 
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exposure to an unrelated frustrating stimulus (having to wait for the researcher to repair a 
malfunctioning VCR) or not frustrated. Following this manipulation, participants were 
asked to determine the length of a prison sentence for the bank robbers in the video. 
Results indicated that, consistent with previous displaced aggression findings, 
participants who had ruminated about the priming violent video and then encountered the 
frustrating stimulus selected a more severe prison sentence than those who had not 
ruminated or had not been frustrated. This finding also supports the existence of a 
relationship between rumination and displaced aggression.  
 In further examination of rumination and aggression, a series of laboratory 
studies were conducted to examine the influence of personality variables (i.e., irritability, 
emotional vulnerability, and rumination) and self-esteem threat on aggression (Caprara, 
Barbaranelli, Colombo, Politi, & Valerio, 1987). In these studies, participants completed 
questionnaires measuring their emotional vulnerability, irritability, and rumination, and 
then received a self-esteem threat manipulation in the form of negative feedback from a 
confederate. Participants were then given an option to punish the confederate via electric 
shock during a cover task. Results suggested that trait rumination is a major contributing 
factor in retaliatory aggression. High ruminators, as measured by the Dissipation-
Rumination Scale (Caprara, 1986), were more aggressive than high dissipaters even after 
partialing out emotional vulnerability and self-esteem threat.  
Rumination has also been observed to act as a moderator between aggression and 
other constructs. Rumination was identified as a moderator in a study exploring the 
relationship between alcohol consumption, alcohol consumption expectancies, and 
aggressive behavior. Participants completed measures of the above constructs. Analysis 
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of self-report data indicated that, in addition to its role in displaced aggression, anger 
rumination did act, along with aggression expectancies, to moderate the relationship 
between alcohol consumption and alcohol related aggression (Borders, Barnwell, & 
Earleywine, 2007).  
In another example, Bushman (2002) induced rumination in a study involving 
catharsis, rumination, and aggression. Participants in this study were provoked through 
negative criticism of an essay they had written and were then shown a picture of the 
supposed evaluator and told to think about him or her while hitting a punching bag. The 
punching bag manipulation presented an opportunity for participants to cathartically 
address negative feelings about their essay feedback. Participants then participated in a 
competitive task in which they delivered a noxious stimulus (a loud noise) to an 
opponent. The punching bag manipulation was effective in inducing anger rumination, 
with participants reporting more anger after hitting the punching bag and thinking about 
their evaluator. Participants who ruminated with the punching bag were found to be more 
aggressive in a competitive task than those who did not, further supporting the connection 
between anger rumination and aggression. Taken together, the above studies indicate a 
general pattern of association between aggression and rumination.  
This relationship between rumination and aggression has been hypothesized to 
originate with the initial provocation. Provocations give rise to an increase in negative 
affect, which in turn activates “a network of aggression-related thoughts and tendencies” 
(Miller et al., 2003, p. 83). Rumination maintains this negative affect and thus continues 
to activate this network of aggression-related cognitions long after the activation would 
normally have dissipated (Miller et al., 2003). 
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The Current Study 
According to Miller’s (2003) theoretical model, the aggressive responding 
observed in ruminators is the result of anger activation prolonged by rumination. 
However, it is unclear what role the perseverative nature of ruminative thought plays in 
aggression over and above the effects of anger. This is an area in which only limited 
experimental research has been conducted. Most studies of perseverance and rumination 
have centered on depressive rumination rather than anger rumination. Moreover, very 
little laboratory research in general has been conducted on the motivation to exert effort 
to aggress after provocation. The current study will examine the impact of anger 
rumination on motivation to aggress.  
The Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP) (Taylor, 1967) has been successfully 
used to measure aggressive behavior in studies examining anger rumination (Bushman, 
2002). The TAP measures aggression using a competitive reaction time paradigm cover 
task. Participants compete in a number of reaction time trials against a fictitious 
opponent. After each trial that the participant ostensibly wins, he or she is given the 
option to select a level of aversive stimulus to deliver to their supposed opponent (e.g., 
loud noise or electric shock). Aggression level is measured by the intensity of aversive 
stimulus selected by the participant during the reaction time trials.  
A modified version of the TAP has been developed to examine whether restricting 
access to a “weapon” would affect aggression in response to provocation (Broman-Fulks, 
Hudson, Bobrycki,, Ratliff, Sloan, Bradley, Clark, & Wells, 2002). In order to select 
increasingly aggressive levels of electric shock, participants had to press a button an 
increasingly large number of times. This forced participants to “work harder” in order to 
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select more aggressive shock levels. Preliminary findings indicated that, even in the face 
of escalating provocation, participants chose less labor intensive levels of shock over 
higher levels of shock that required more button presses to activate. Participants in a low-
effort group wherein each shock option required only one button press to activate 
responded to escalating provocation with escalating levels of electric shock. No 
differences in shock selection were found between participants who believed that their 
opponent had to exert effort to aggress and those who believed that their opponent could 
select shocks freely. Overall, it appears that requiring a participant to exert effort to gain 
access to more intense aggressive responses lowers the probability of the occurrence of 
aggression. The current study will also use this paradigm to examine the relation between 
anger rumination and aggression.  
Study Rationale and Aims 
 As requiring effort to access a weapon has been initially shown to decrease 
aggressive behavior, it logically follows that interventions that present a similar 
requirement of effort (e.g., handgun waiting periods, decreasing access to weapons 
among aggression-prone individuals) would decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of 
aggressive behavior. The purpose of this study was to further examine the above 
relationship between effort condition and aggressive behavior, specifically examining the 
possible intervention of anger rumination in this relationship.  As described above, anger 
rumination has been shown to promote both aggression and possibly some perseverative 
behavior. These qualities could potentially promote an increase in aggressive behavior 
despite increased effort requirements. If indeed this is the case, findings could inform 
  
 
 
19
future interventions to prevent aggressive behavior such as screening for a tendency 
toward anger rumination in individuals at risk to aggress.  
Thus, this study examined the unique contribution of anger rumination over and 
above trait anger on aggression as measured by TAP, when a higher level of effort to 
aggress is required.  To this end:  
1. Levels of anger and anger rumination in study participants were obtained 
through self-report measures.  
2. All participants were angered using an anger-induction protocol (described 
below)  
3. Following anger induction, participants completed the TAP with either a high-
effort or low-effort requirement to aggress. Participants were increasingly 
provoked via shock feedback.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1:  As observed in Broman-Fulks et al. (2002) it is hypothesized that 
requiring effortful responding will decrease aggressive responding even at high levels of 
provocation. 
Hypothesis 2: Because of the anger-sustaining nature of ruminative thought, it is 
hypothesized that higher levels of anger rumination will uniquely predict higher levels of 
aggression in response to provocation in the high-effort group. These effects are expected 
to persist after the effects of anger are controlled. 
Hypothesis 3:  It is expected that anger rumination will not be uniquely associated 
with aggression when trait anger is controlled in the low-effort condition. However, trait 
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anger is expected to be positively associated with aggressive responding in this condition 
controlling for anger rumination, especially under high levels of provocation.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 150 undergraduate students participated in this study. Data from 27 
participants were excluded after debriefing suggested that they were not fully deceived. 
Of the remaining participants, 83 were female and 40 were male. Ages ranged from 18-
51 years (M = 20.9, SD = 4.6). 56.9% of participants identified as African-American, 
39.8% identified at Caucasian, 1.6% identified as Hispanic, and 1.6% identified their race 
as “other.” Volunteers were recruited to participate in a study on “Personality matching 
and joint performance on a reaction time task.” This study title was used to mask the true 
purpose of the study, and to provide a cover task for the false negative feedback used to 
elicit anger rumination. Participants received credit in psychology courses in exchange 
for participation.  
Measures 
Assessment of Anger Rumination. 
Dissipation-Rumination Scale. Trait rumination was assessed using the 
Dissipation-Rumination Scale (DRS; Caprara, 1986). The DRS is a 20-item measure of 
anger rumination used to identify the tendency to either ruminate or dissipate anger. Five 
of the 20 items are distracter items. The DRS is scored on a 6-point Likert-like scale with 
responses ranging from completely false for me to completely true for me. This scale has 
been validated through several experiments. The scale was validated experimentally, with 
higher rumination scores predicting higher levels of aggression as long as 24 hours after 
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provocation (Caprara, 1986).  The DRS was the primary measure of anger rumination 
used in this study. The Cronbach’s α from this administration of the scale was .91.  
Assessment of Anger 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 – Trait Anger Scale. The Trait Anger 
scale of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999) was 
used to measure trait anger. The STAXI-2 is a widely used 57-item measure of anger. 
This scale measures state anger, trait anger, and anger expression. The trait anger scale is 
10-item scale measuring respondents “general feelings” of anger. The full STAXI 
displayed high internal consistency (α = .85), and the trait anger scale’s internal 
consistency was comparable (α = .86). The STAXI-2 has been validated through strong 
correlations with other measures of anger and hostility (Suris & Coccaro, 2008). 
 Differential Emotions Scale. The Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard, 1972) 
was used as a very brief anger manipulation check following provocation. This scale is a 
very brief visual analogue measure of mood states, including anger, happiness, sadness, 
fear, and anxiety. Respondents rate a list of “feeling” words by marking a horizontal line 
representing a continuum from not at all to very much. The respondent is instructed to 
place a mark on the line indicating how much or little they are feeling that emotion at the 
current moment. The scale is scored by measuring the area of line up to the mark made 
by participants in increments of 1/10th of an inch.  
Validation Measures of Anger Rumination 
Two other measures of anger rumination, the Displaced Aggression Questionnaire 
and the Anger Rumination Scale, were also administered in order to validate the DRS. 
The DRS was used as the primary measure of anger rumination in this study because of 
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its length, previous association with aggressive behavior (Caprara, 1986), and because 
other available anger rumination scales measure other constructs in addition to anger 
rumination. The psychometric properties of these two scales are described below.  
Displaced Aggression Questionnaire. The DRS was validated in part through the 
Displaced Aggression Questionnaire (DAQ; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). The 
DAQ is composed of 31 items and is scored on a 7-point bi-polar Likert-type scale, with 
responses ranging from extremely characteristic of me to extremely uncharacteristic of 
me. It has been validated through a series of experimental paradigms with test scores 
predicting actual displaced aggression in the laboratory, with beta weights ranging from 
.26 to .34 (Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006).  The scale is divided into three subscales: 
“Anger Rumination” (10 items), composed of items measuring the tendency to remember 
and dwell on previous provocations and anger-inducing events; “Revenge Planning” (11 
items), composed of items asking about fantasies of revenge as well as beliefs and 
behaviors related to revenge; and “Displaced Aggression” (10 items), composed of items 
about taking out one’s anger on innocent others. The anger rumination scale and revenge 
planning scale to a lesser degree are expected to be associated with DRS.  The displaced 
aggression scale is not predicted to be as strongly associated with the DRS because it is a 
separate although related construct. Internal consistency for DAQ total scores (α = .97), 
anger rumination (α = .95), revenge planning (α = .94), and displaced aggression (α = 
.93) were all high.   
Anger Rumination Scale. To further examine the validity of the DRS, a second 
anger rumination scale was administered. The Anger Rumination Scale (ARS; 
Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2006), is composed of 19 items and is scored on a 4- 
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point Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from almost always to never. Validity was 
established through correlation with other measures of anger and rumination 
(Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2006) including the STAXI-II (r = .57) and Measure 
of Negative Affectivity (r =.54).  
 The ARS is divided into four subscales. These subscales are “Understanding 
Causes” (4 items), which relates to attempts why anger and anger provoking situations 
occur; “Angry Memories” (5 items), which relates to the tendency to hold onto memories 
of anger or anger provoking situations; “Angry Afterthoughts” (6 items), which involves 
cognitively returning to memories of previous anger-provoking situations and continuing 
to focus on their content; and “Thoughts of Revenge” (4 items), which relates to a 
tendency to fantasize about getting revenge. All four of these subscales are expected to be 
associated with the DRS.  Internal consistency coefficients for were found to be strong 
for the total ARS measure (α = .96), angry memories subscale (α = .91), angry 
afterthoughts subscale (α = .92), understanding causes subscale (α = .80), and thoughts of 
revenge subscale (α = .84). 
Procedure 
 The participants were randomly assigned to one of two effort conditions. One 
group completed the TAP with the high-effort (HE) shock selection requirement and the 
other completed the TAP with the low-effort (LE) selection procedures in the paradigm. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the researcher greeted the participant and escorted him or 
her to a room labeled “Subject A” and informed him or her that the opponent had already 
begun completing paper work. Informed consent was then obtained (see Appendix A). 
After the informed consent process, the researcher informed the participant that he or she 
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was “Subject A,” and would be working with Subject B in the adjoining room. The 
participant then completed a set of demographic questionnaires.  
Next, the researcher began a procedure designed to induce anger in the 
participants. Two standard neuropsychology tasks (a computer version of the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task and a pen-and-paper version of the Trail Making Task) were 
administered. These tasks were not used as part of data analyses, but rather as part of the 
anger induction. The purpose of these tasks was to provide an impetus for the 
experimenter to provided false, presumably anger-inducing negative performance 
feedback to participants.  The DES was also administered following the completion of 
these tasks. The researcher then told the participant that he (the researcher) “Needed to 
compare both subjects’ test results to before beginning the reaction time task.” This 
provided a cover-task for the false feedback. After a five minute delay, the researcher 
returned to the participant’s room with a sheet of paper bearing an apparently hand-drawn 
bell curve diagram which was given to the participant and ostensibly Subject B. The 
researcher next attached finger tip electrodes to the index and middle fingers of the 
participant’s non-dominant hand via Velcro strips. The participant was told, “Please hold 
your hand still on the table for the rest of the task. You will use your other hand for the 
reaction-time task, and to fill out a few remaining questions.”  
The researcher then excused himself to go to the control room and read the 
following script over an intercom:  
Subjects A and B, we have completed just about everything in the study so far 
except for the reaction time game. Results of almost all of the testing so far 
indicates that the two of you are very similar. The only difference we found was 
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on the card-matching test, which we believe is a measure intellectual capacity or 
intelligence. If you look at the diagram that I put in each of your rooms, you will 
notice that Subject A performed a bit below average, while Subject B performed a 
little above average. Otherwise, your test performance was very similar. Now 
then, we’re ready to go on with calibrating the reaction-time task. 
Following the delivery of this information, the researcher began the shock 
threshold procedure (see Appendix C). Increasing levels of electric shock (by 100 
microamperes) were administered. The researcher stopped the procedure when the 
participant rated the shock as definitely very unpleasant and did not want to receive any 
higher level. This shock level was the upper shock pain threshold. The procedure was 
then repeated for the fictitious opponent, using an audio recording to simulate the 
opponent’s responses. In order to avoid confounding by gender, the participant interacted 
with a same-sex opponent. This was accomplished by playing gender-matched audio files 
and referring to the opponent as “he” or “she” throughout, as appropriate. 
After the threshold procedure, the researcher played recorded instructions for the 
TAP over the intercom (see Appendix C). Following the conclusion of these instructions, 
the researcher then asked Subject A if he or she was ready to begin. At this point the 
anger rumination induction commenced. After a brief pause, the researcher also asked if 
Subject B was ready to continue. At this point, the researcher played a voice recording in 
which Subject B said: “I’m ready, and I’m pretty sure I’m going to beat Subject A on the 
reaction game just like I did on the intelligence test.” To prevent the participant from 
responding to this induction before the TAP, the researcher immediately said, “Okay, I’m 
going to turn off the intercom so we can get the task going. Please fill out the DES form 
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once again to determine continued match and we’ll begin.” Upon completion of the DES, 
the researcher began the TAP.  
Note that that the anger induction procedure was piloted on 4 graduate students 
prior to beginning data collection in order to gauge how anger-eliciting this induction was 
(rated on a 6-point scale from not at all to extremely) and to determine whether or not 
aspects of the script need to be modified. Responses ranged from 4-6. Some minor 
modifications were made to the script in order to increase believability. 
During the TAP, participants were ostensibly competing against an opponent at 
holding down a spacebar and attempting to release it more quickly than their opponent 
when prompted via a message on a computer screen. Participants were told that if they 
were slower than the opponent they would receive an electric shock of an intensity 
selected by the opponent. Participants were told that if participants were faster than their 
opponent they would be given the option to deliver an electric shock to their opponent of 
an intensity of their choosing. The participant used the computer’s keyboard to select a 
shock. The justification given to participants for the use of electric shocks is that the 
shocks are motivating sensory stimuli to increase performance in the reaction time task. 
Shock levels ranged from 0-20, with the 10 shock being equal to the upper threshold 
defined during the threshold task, the 9 shock being equal to 95% of this threshold, 8 to 
90%, 7 to 85%, and so on. The 20 was described as representing “an extremely painful 
shock twice the intensity of the pain threshold that could cause minor tissue damage that 
will quickly heal.” Thus, the 20 was defined as an unequivocally aggressive response. 
Participants may also select a 0 option, which delivers no shock to the opponent, although 
this option has only infrequently been selected in previous research. 
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Wins, losses, and opponent shock selections were pre–programmed and 
computer-controlled. Participants were determined to “lose” on 50% of trials and “win” 
on 50% of trials. Participants completed 28 trials with the opponent’s shocks becoming 
increasingly more provocative. The 28 trials consisted of an initial trial followed by four 
provocation blocks of six trials each. Average shock during the first block was 2.5 (2s 
and 3s), followed by blocks averaging 5.5 (5s and 6s), 8.5 (8s and 9s), and 8.5. 
Intermediate shock levels between the first three blocks (4 and 7) were used to smooth 
the transition between blocks. Shock feedback of 20 from the opponent was included 
between the third and fourth blocks. Of course, the participant was programmed to win 
this trial, so the 20 shock was never administered. The inclusion of this trial was intended 
to be highly provocative and to elicit counter-aggression.  
In the high-effort group, participants were required to press the space bar an 
increasing number of times to set higher shocks. Participants had to press the space bar 
10 times to set a 1 shock, 20 times to set a 2 shock, 30 times to set a 3 shock, and so on to 
200 times to select a 20 shock. Participants were informed via computer monitor about 
the shock level they have earned access to. The participants were free to stop button-
presses at any time once a particular shock level was reached. Participants in the low-
effort TAP condition were able to access all shocks with equal effort by simply selecting 
a shock choice with a single button press. Aggression was defined by the shock level 
selected for the opponent to receive on trials the participant “wins.” Two shock indices 
were used as outcome variables: a) average shock selected on each block, and b) number 
of extreme (20) shocks selected per block.  
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Following completion of the TAP, the participant completed a post-task 
questionnaire, which included items asking about performance on the reaction time trials 
and about his or her perceptions regarding the purpose of the experiment (Appendix B), 
anger rumination measures, and the STAXI-2. The post-task questionnaire was designed 
to determine if the deception necessary for the TAP was successful. Participants who did 
not accept the cover task or know the true purpose of the study were excluded from the 
data set for analysis purposes. Following completion of the post-task questionnaire, 
participants were debriefed, asked not to share details with other participants and 
dismissed. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Means, standard deviations, and measures of skew and kurtosis were computed 
for all measures of anger rumination and anger rumination subscales, the STAXI-II Trait 
Anger Scale, and both shock indices (Table 1).  Chi square tests were performed in order 
to determine if the participants in the two effort conditions differed as a function of 
ethnicity and gender. No significant differences were found for either gender or ethnicity. 
Independent samples t-tests were also performed to determine if participants in the high 
and low effort conditions differed in their levels of age, trait anger, or anger rumination. 
No differences between groups were found for trait anger or age. However, significant 
between groups differences emerged among all three measures of anger rumination. DRS 
total scores were significantly higher in the low-effort condition (M = 44.10, SD = 18.08) 
than in the delayed access condition (M = 39.18, SD = 12.78; t [120] = 1.73, p < .05. 
Similarly, DAQ total scores were significantly higher in the low-effort condition (M = 
81.95. SD = 41.98) than in the delayed access condition (M = 41.98, SD = 29.37; t [120] 
= 2.51, p < .05). Consistent with the other anger rumination measures, ARS scores were 
higher in the low-effort condition (M = 37.84, SD = 15.56) than in the delayed access 
condition (M = 30.72, SD = 11.12) by a significant margin, t (120) = 2.90, p < .05. 
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Table 1  
 
 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Measures  n M SD Skew Kurtosis 
DRS 122 63.06 16.65 0.38 -0.31 
DAQ 122 73.83 37.12 1.08 0.43 
Anger Rumination 122 23.91 13.60 0.83 -0.25 
Revenge Planning 122 24.36 15.36 1.38 1.10 
Displaced Aggression 122 25.56 13.19 1.13 0.64 
ARS 122 34.34 13.97 1.02 0.23 
Angry Afterthoughts 122 10.84 5.04 0.92 -0.31 
Thoughts of Revenge 122 6.33 2.92 1.53 1.93 
Angry Memories 122 8.96 4.18 1.06 0.07 
Understanding 
Causes 
122 
8.21 3.20 0.60 -0.45 
STAXI-II T 121 17.80 5.92 0.97 0.57 
Mean Shock 123 4.96 2.22 -0.01 -0.01 
Total 20s 123 1.36 3.92 4.60 22.77 
Note. DAQ = Displaced Aggression Questionnaire, ARS = Anger Rumination Scale, DRS = Dissipation-
Rumination Scale, STAXI-II T = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-II Trait Anger Scale. 
 
Bivariate Correlations 
Bivariate correlations (Table 2) were computed between the mean shock level 
selected across all trials, the total 20s selected across all trials, anger rumination measure 
total scores (DAQ total score, ARS total score, and DRS total score) and Trait Anger as 
measured by the STAXI. All measures of anger rumination and trait anger were 
correlated positively, and both shock indices were positively correlated with each other, 
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as expected.  All measures of anger rumination except for DAQ Revenge Planning were 
significantly correlated with average shock selected on the TAP, however, only the DRS 
was significantly correlated with total 20 shocks selected.   
DES Anger Pre/Post 
Recall that this study included an anger induction component, in which participants 
received false, negative feedback on a performance task and then were denigrated about 
their supposed performance. In order to determine if this provocation effectively induced 
anger in participants, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted examining state anger 
as measured by the DES before and after participants received false feedback on their 
WCST performance and heard the provocation sound clip. DES anger scores before 
provocation (M = 3.84, SD = .71) were lower than scores following provocation (M = 
6.25, SD = .94), and this difference was significant, F (1,119) = 9.91, p < .05. This 
finding indicated that the provocation induction was successful in inducing state anger in 
participants. A multiple regression was also conducted in order to determine if there was 
any effect of trait anger or rumination proneness on the difference between pre and post 
anger. This regression model did not significant predict a difference in anger intensity in 
response to the induction based either on anger rumination or trait anger.  
  
 
 
Table 2  
 
Intercorrelations between Rumination Measures and Subscales, Anger Measures, and Aggression Measures 
 
Measures DRS DAQ D1 D2 D3 ARS A1 A2 A3 A4 STAXI Mean Shock Total 20s 
DRS --- .81** .79** .81** .53** .77** .71** .76** .70** .65** .70** .34** .19* 
DAQ  --- .91** .91** .82** .91** .86** .86** .83** .76** .80** .21* .08 
D1   --- .78** .62** .91** .87** .79** .86** .76** .72** .22* .04 
D2    --- .58** .84** .78** .87** .76** .65** .73** .24** .10 
D3     --- .64** .61** .59** .55** .58** .65** .09 .07 
ARS      --- .95** .89** .91** .87** .72** .25** .07 
A1       --- .80** .82** .79** .68** .27** .02 
A2        --- .77** .70** .67** .25** .14 
A3         --- .69** .67** .18* .07 
A4          --- .60** .20* .03 
STAXI T           --- .19* .06 
Mean Shock            --- .52** 
Total 20s             --- 
Note. DRS = Dissipation Rumination Scale, DAQ = Displaced Aggression Questionnaire, D1 = DAQ Anger Rumination, D2 = DAQ Revenge Planning, D3 = 
DAQ Displaced Aggression, ARS = Anger Rumination Scale, A1 = ARS Angry Afterthoughts, A2 = ARS Thoughts of Revenge, A3 = ARS Angry Memories, 
A4 = ARS Understanding Causes, STAXI T= State Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Trait Anger Scale 
* p < .05, ** p < .0
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DRS Validation 
 In order to examine the validity of the Dissipation-Rumination Scale, a two step 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed with DRS total scores as the 
dependent variable. The STAXI-II Trait Anger subscale was entered in step one. The 
second step included subscales from the Anger Rumination Scale (Understanding Causes, 
Angry Memories, Thoughts of Revenge, and Angry Afterthoughts) and subscales from 
the Displaced Aggression Questionnaire (Anger Rumination, Revenge Planning, and 
Displaced Aggression). Results of this regression can be viewed in Table 3, and β 
weights and associated statistics can be viewed in Table 4. 
Table 3  
 
Significance of ARS Validation Regression Model 
 
Step R R2 ∆F df (reg.) df (res.) 
1 .70 .50 115.47* 1 118 
2 .86 .73 14.00* 7 111 
Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)  
*p < .001 
 
   
Table 4  
 
B Weights and Associated Statistics for DRS Validation Regression Model 
 
Predictor ∆R2 β t 
Step 1 .50*   
Trait Anger  .70* 10.75 
Step 2 .24*   
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Table 4 (continued).    
Predictor ∆R2 β t 
ARS Angry Afterthoughts  -.09 -0.79 
ARS Thoughts of Revenge  .12 1.07 
ARS Angry Memories  -.13 -1.18 
ARS Understanding Causes  .03 0.31 
DAQ Anger Rumination  .46* 3.67 
DAQ Revenge Planning  .41* 3.73 
DAQ Displaced Aggression  -.05 -0.74 
Note. *p < .001 
 Both steps 1 and 2 predicted significant variance in anger rumination as measured 
by the DRS. As can be seen in Table 3, trait anger was found to significantly predict 
anger rumination in Step 1, t = 10.75, p < .001, β = .70. This is consistent with theoretical 
expectations, given the interrelatedness of anger and anger rumination as constructs. This 
significant overlap between anger and anger rumination, and the anger rumination 
subscales can be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5 
 
Step 1 Excluded Variables DRS Validation Regression Model 
 
Predictor β in T 
Step 1   
ARS Angry Afterthoughts .43* 7.44 
ARS Thoughts of Revenge .52* 7.01 
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Table 5 (continued).   
Predictor β in t 
ARS Angry Memories .41* 5.10 
ARS Understanding Causes .33* 0.31 
DAQ Anger Rumination .58* 3.67 
DAQ Revenge Planning .63* 3.73 
DAQ Displaced Aggression .11 1.32 
Note. *p < .001 
If entered in the first step, all subscales except DAQ displaced aggression would 
be significantly predictive of DRS total score. It appears that much of this overlap is due 
to trait anger. In Step 2, only two DAQ subscales, Anger Rumination (t = 3.67, p < .001, 
β = .46), and Revenge Planning (t = 3.73, p <.001, β = .41), were found to uniquely 
predict 24% of the variance in DRS total score over and above the effects of trait anger 
observed in step 1. The change in R2 between steps 1 and 2 (∆R2 = .24, p < .001) is 
significant and provides qualified support to the idea that the DRS is measuring a 
separate  rumination construct beyond anger alone that seems uniquely associated with 
revenge planning and anger rumination as measured by the DAQ. 
Multiple Regressions 
Description of Multiple Regression Model 
Two sets of multiple regression analyses were tested, with each set using a 
different shock index to measure aggression. The first group of regressions used the 
average level of shocks selected across TAP trials, whereas the second group of 
regressions used the total number of 20-shocks selected during TAP trials. Total DRS 
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score, a continuous variable, was selected as a measure of anger rumination. The trait-
anger STAXI-II subscale, also a continuous variable, was used to measure trait anger. 
Effort condition and gender were both dummy coded (0 = low-effort condition, 1 = high-
effort condition; 1 = male, 2 = female). To test the moderation effects postulated in 
hypothesis 2, an interaction term between effort condition and anger rumination was 
generated. Similarly, an interaction term between trait anger and effort condition was 
generated to test the moderation effect expected by hypothesis 3. Attempts to correct for 
skew in DRS and STAXI-II data via transformations did not significantly affect the 
outcome of the analyses. Multiple regression was selected as the data analysis procedure 
because of the continuous nature of the rumination and trait anger scales used, However, 
because the dependent variable (aggression across provocation blocks) was a repeated 
measure, it was impossible to analyze the data using a single multiple regression. In order 
to address this issue, the “sum/difference regression method” (Giancola, 2004, p. 548) 
was used.    
Recall that, in order to provoke participants, increasingly severe shock feedback 
was presented in four blocks. In order to examine this within-subjects variable using this 
regression method, shocks selected during blocks 1 and 2 were summed into a single low 
provocation block, and shocks selected during blocks 3 and 4 were summed into a single 
high-provocation block.  Using these high and low provocation blocks, two dependent 
variables were derived.  Low and high blocks were summed into a single term 
representing shocks selected on all TAP trials (DV1), which was used to examine all 
between subjects effects, independent of provocation. To derive the second dependent 
variable (DV2), the difference between shocks selected in the high and low provocation 
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trials (High Block – Low Block) was calculated. DV2 allows for the examination of the 
within-subjects effects of provocation. This technique has been used previously and 
established as a multiple regression equivalent of repeated measures ANOVA; removing 
the need to dichotomize continuous variables (Giancola, 2004). Each of these DVs was 
regressed onto the same three step regression model. The model is as follows: Gender 
was included in the first step, effort condition, anger rumination and trait anger were 
added in the second step, and the interaction terms (anger rumination x effort condition 
and trait anger x effort condition) were entered in the third step.   
In addition to the above, two more DVs were calculated and used in additional 
regression analyses. These regressions examined between-subjects effects at high and 
low levels of provocation individually, with the low-provocation DV being the sum 
provocation blocks 1 and 2, and the high-provocation DV being the sum of blocks 3 and 
4.  As above, the same three step regression model was used for the Low/High 
regressions. Gender was included in the first step, effort condition, anger rumination and 
trait anger were added in the second step, and the interaction terms (anger rumination x 
effort condition and trait anger x effort condition) were entered in the third step.   
In summary, two sets of four multiple regressions, each with a different dependent 
variable were conducted. The first set of regressions used mean shock as an aggression 
index and the second set used total 20 shocks as an aggression index. The first regression 
in each set used DV1 (blocks 1 and 2 + blocks 3 and 4) as its dependent variable. The 
second regression in each set used DV2 (blocks 3 and 4 – blocks 1 and 2) as the 
dependent variable. The third regression in each set used the low provocation blocks 
(block 1 + block 2) as a dependent variable, and the fourth regression used the high 
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provocation blocks (block 3 + block 4) as the dependent variable.  Thus, a total of eight 
regressions were computed in the study (2 shock indices x 4 DVs).  
Regressions Using Mean Shock as a Shock Index   
 DV1/DV2 regressions. Regression models examining mean shocks selected 
during the TAP as DVs was conducted first. DV1 was regressed onto the 3-step multiple 
regression model. As noted above, this model examines between groups main and 
interaction effects independent of within groups effects. DV1 regression model results are 
presented in the left side of Table 6 and β weights and associated statistics are presented 
in the left side of Table 7.  
The second step of the regression (entry of main effects of effort condition, trait 
anger, and anger rumination) was the only step that accounted for a significant amount of 
variance in mean shock across provocation groups F (4,115) = 11.96, p < .001, R2 = .24. 
Effort condition (t = -5.42, p < .001, β = -.43) was found to be a significant predictor of 
mean shock in this model, with participants in the high effort condition selecting lower 
mean shocks than those assigned to the low-effort group.  
Table 6  
 
Significance of DV1/DV2 Regression Model – Mean Shock 
 
 DV1 DV2 
Step R R2 ∆F df reg. df  res. R R2 ∆F df reg. df  res. 
1 .10 .01 1.25 1 118 .15 .02 2.72 1 118 
2 .54 .29 15.38* 3 115 .38 .15 5.56* 3 115 
3 .55 .31 .93 2 113 .41 .17 1.61 2 113 
Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)  
 
* p < .001 
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Table 7  
 
β Weights and Associated Statistics for DV1/DV2 Multiple Regression Model – Mean 
Shock 
 
  DV1  DV2 
Predictor  ∆R2 β T  ∆R2 β t 
Step 1 .01    .02   
Gender  .10 1.12   -.15 -1.66 
Step 2 .28**    .12*   
Gender  .60 0.75   -.15 -1.65 
Effort Condition  -.43** -5.42   -.35** -4.02 
Trait Anger  -.13 -1.18   -.04 -0.36 
Rumination  .35* 3.05   .04 0.04 
Step 3 .03    .02   
Gender  .05 0.64   -.14 -1.58 
Effort Condition  -.71* -2.62   -.41 -1.37 
Trait Anger  -.27 -1.71   .13 0.76 
Rumination  .42* 2.77   -.16 -0.96 
Rum. X Effort  -.16 -0.50   .60 1.77 
Ang. X Effort  .44 1.28   -.53 -1.40 
Note. * p < .01, ** p <.001 
Anger rumination (t = 3.05, p < .01, β = .35) also accounted for unique variance in 
mean shock independent of provocation, with higher levels of rumination associated with 
higher levels of average shock selected. Trait anger and gender were not uniquely 
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predictive of mean shock, and no significant moderation effects were noted for either 
interaction term.  
In order to examine the effect of provocation on the above relationships, DV2 was 
regressed onto the same 3-step model described above. Again, only the second step of the 
regression accounted for a significant amount of variance in mean shock between the 
high and low provocation blocks F(4, 115) = 4.93, p < .01, R2 = .15. Effort condition 
significantly accounted for a unique portion of the variance in mean shock selected 
between high and low provocation blocks. The dampening effect on aggression in the 
high-effort condition, noted in the DV1 model, was found to persist despite provocation 
(t = -4.02, p < .001, β = -.35). Conversely, the significant, aggression-promoting effect 
noted for anger rumination in the DV1 model was not noted in this model: anger 
rumination did not account for a significant amount of the variance between provocation 
blocks. Similarly, gender, trait anger, and neither interaction term were insignificant.  
Low/high provocation regressions – mean shocks. To examine the variables at 
each level of provocation, a separate multiple regression analysis was conducted at each 
of the (low/high) levels of provocation. In the first of these analyses, the mean shocks 
selected during the block of low provocation trials were regressed onto the same 3-step 
regression model used above (recall: Step 1: Gender; Step 2: Effort Condition, 
Rumination, Trait Anger; Step 3: Effort/Rumination, Effort/Anger interaction terms). 
Results of these regressions for mean shock are presented in Table 8 and β weights and 
associated statistics are presented in Table 9.  
Both the first step (F (1, 118) = 4.32, p < .05, R2= .04) and second step (F (4, 
115) = 8.62, p < .001, R2= .23) of this regression were significantly predictive of 
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aggression across the trials that compose the low provocation block.  In the first step, 
gender was found to predict unique variance in aggression (t = 2.08, p < .05, β = .19), 
with men selecting higher levels of shock on average than women.  
Table 8   
 
Significance of Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Mean Shock 
 
 Low High 
Step R R2 ∆F df reg. df  res. R R2 ∆F df reg. df  res. 
1 .19 .04 4.32* 1 118 .03 .00 0.09 1 118 
2 .48 .23 9.73** 3 115 .54 .29 15.53** 3 115 
3 .51 .26 2.24 2 113 .54 .01 0.43 2 113 
Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)  
* p <.05,** p < .001 
In the second step, both effort condition (t = -3.66, p < .001, β = -.30) and 
rumination (t = 3.08, p < .01, β = .36) significantly predicted aggression. High-effort 
group members selected lower shocks than their low-effort counterparts, and higher anger 
rumination scores again predicted higher aggression scores. No significant effects were 
noted for trait anger or for the Effort x Rumination interaction term. The Effort x Trait 
Anger interaction term accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in Step 3, 
but the entry of the interaction terms in Step 3 did not significantly contribute to the 
model on the whole (∆F= 2.24, p > .05, R2 = .03) giving this finding questionable 
importance.  
In the final regression in this set, mean shocks selected during the high 
provocation trials were regressed onto the same three step model. Results are depicted on 
right side of Tables 8 and 9. Only the second step was significant F (4, 115) = 11.68, p < 
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.001, R2= .29. As in the low provocation block, participants assigned to the high-effort 
group (t = -5.85, p < .001, β = -.47) selected lower levels of shock on average and 
participants who indicated higher levels of rumination (t = 2.53, p < .05, β = .29) selected 
higher levels of shock. No significant effects were noted for gender, trait anger, or either 
interaction term. 
Table 9  
 
β Weights and Associated Statistics for Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Mean Shock 
 
  Low Provocation  High Provocation 
Predictor  ∆R2 β t  ∆R2 β t 
Step 1 .04*    .00   
Gender  .19* 2.08   .03 0.30 
Step 2 .20***    .29***   
Gender  .14 1.66   -.00 -0.05 
Effort Condition  -.30*** -3.66   -.47*** -5.85 
Trait Anger  -.12 -1.06   -.12 -1.07 
Rumination  .36** 3.08   .29* 2.53 
Step 3 .03    .01   
Gender  .13 1.52   -.01 -0.10 
Effort Condition  -.59 -2.10   -.71* -2.59 
Trait Anger  -.36 -2.23   -.17 -1.05 
Rumination  .54*** 3.48   .28* 1.81 
Rum. X Effort  -.47 -1.47   .09 0.29 
Ang. X Effort  .76 2.12   .16 0.47 
Note. * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Regressions Using 20 Shock as a Shock Index 
DV1/DV2 regressions – 20 shocks. Recall that, during the presentation of TAP 
instructions, participants were told that setting a 20-level shock for their opponent would 
be severely painful and could cause mild tissue damage, thus the selection of a 20 shock 
was considered definitely aggressive. In order to corroborate results observed using mean 
shock, the number of 20 shocks selected was used as a second index of aggression. Both 
total 20s across provocation blocks (DV1) and the difference between the number of 20s 
selected at the low and high provocation blocks (DV2) were regressed onto the same 
three-step regression model described above. 
DV1 regression model results are presented in the left side of Table10 and β 
weights and associated statistics are presented in the left side of Table 11. The general 
pattern of results observed for DV1 using the mean shock aggression index is maintained 
in the current regression as well. The second step was the only one of the three to 
significantly predicted the number of 20 shocks selected across all provocation blocks F 
(4, 115) = 2.96, p <.05, R2 = .09.  
Table 10  
 
Significance of DV1/DV2 Regression Model – Total 20 Shocks 
 
 DV1 DV2 
Step R R2 ∆F df reg. df  res. R R2 ∆F df reg. df  res. 
1 .15 .02 2.66 1 118 .02 .00 0.03 1 118 
2 .31 .09 3.01* 3 115 .24 .06 2.38 3 115 
3 .35 .08 1.88 2 113 .29 .09 1.69 2 113 
Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)  
* p < .05 
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Table 11  
 
β Weights and Associated Statistics for DV1/DV2 Multiple Regression Model – Total 20 
Shocks 
 
  DV1  DV2 
Predictor  ∆R2 β t  ∆R2 β T 
Step 1 .02    .00   
Gender  .15 1.63   .15 0.16 
Step 2 .07*    .06   
Gender  .11 1.21   .05 0.56 
Effort Condition  -.18† 1.94   -.18† -1.98 
Trait Anger  -.16 -1.26   .21 1.62 
Rumination  .27* 2.09   -.20 -1.50 
Step 3 .03    .03   
Gender  .11 1.21   .06 0.64 
Effort Condition  .17 0.55   -.24 -0.78 
Trait Anger  -.26* -1.47   .40* 2.22 
Rumination  .45** 2.67   -.41* -2.35 
Rum. X Effort  -.63* -1.81   .64 1.82 
Ang. X Effort  .26 0.66   -.57 -1.43 
Note. † = Approaches Significance, * p < .05, ** p <.001 
Rumination again accounted for a significant portion of unique variance in the 
model (t = 2.09, p < .05, β = .27), indicating that as anger rumination increases the 
number of 20s selected increases as well. Effort condition did not explain a significant 
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amount of unique variance in 20 shocks, but it did approach significance (t = -1.94, p > 
.05, β = -.18). This result suggested that participants in the high-effort condition may 
have selected fewer 20 shocks, but it cannot be stated with 95% certainty. Consistent with 
findings from the mean shock DV1 model, gender, trait anger, and the Anger x Effort and 
Rumination x Effort interaction terms did not significantly contribute to the model.  
Results for DV2 are listed in the right side of Table 10. β weights and associated 
statistics are presented in the right side of Table 11. No significant linear relationship 
emerged when DV2 was regressed onto the model using total 20s as an aggression index.   
Low/high provocation regressions – 20 shocks. To examine the variables at each 
level of provocation, a separate multiple regression was conducted at each (low/high) 
level of provocation. In the first regression, Total 20 shocks selected during the block of 
low provocation trials were regressed onto the same 3-step regression model used in 
previous analyses (Step 1: Gender; Step 2: Effort Condition, Rumination, Trait Anger; 
Step 3: Effort/Rumination, Effort/Anger interaction terms). Results of this regression are 
presented in the left side of Table 12 and B weights and associated statistics are presented 
in the left side of Table 13.  
Only the second step of the regression significantly predicted aggressive behavior 
F(3, 115) = 2.60, p < .05, R2 = .08. Only rumination was uniquely predictive of 
aggression in this step (t = 2.48, p < .05, β = .32) with higher rumination scores 
promoting the selection of more 20 shocks. Gender, effort condition and the interaction 
between trait anger and effort condition did not uniquely account for aggressive behavior 
in the model. Trait anger and the interaction between rumination and effort condition 
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were both significant in the third step, but that step did was not significantly predictive of 
aggression in the total model. 
Table 12  
 
Significance of Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Total 20 Shocks 
 
 Low High 
Step R R2 ∆F df reg. df  res. R R2 ∆F df reg. df  res. 
1 .14 .02 2.27 1 118 .14 .02 2.50 1 118 
2 .29 .08 2.68* 3 115 .31 .10 3.21* 3 115 
3 .36 .13 2.88 2 113 .33 .11 0.91 2 113 
Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)  
* p < .05 
Results of the high provocation block regression, depicted in the right sides of 
tables 12 and 13, differed somewhat from the previous regression. Again, only the second 
step in the model was a significant predictor of aggressive behavior F(3, 115) = 3.21, p < 
.05, R2 = .10. However, in contrast to the results of the low-provocation block regression, 
effort condition (t = -2.46, p < .05, β = -.22) uniquely predicted the number of 20 shocks 
selected by participants, with high-effort group members selecting significantly lower 
numbers of 20s. Gender, anger rumination, trait anger, and the interaction terms did not 
account for a significant portion of unique variance in the model.  
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Table 13  
 
β Weights and Associated Statistics for Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Total 20 
Shocks 
  Low Provocation  High Provocation 
Predictor  ∆R2 β t  ∆R2 β t 
Step 1 .02    .02   
Gender  .14 1.51   .14 1.58 
Step 2 .06*    .08*   
Gender  .09 0.98   -.12 1.32 
Effort 
Condition 
 -.11 -1.22   -.22* -2.46 
Trait Anger  -.22 -1.73   -.09 -0.07 
Rumination  .32* 2.48   .19 1.49 
Step 3 .04    .01   
Gender  .09 0.95   .12 1.33 
Effort 
Condition 
 .24 0.79   .08 0.27 
Trait Anger  -.37* -2.14   -.12 -0.67 
Rumination  .56** 3.33   .30 1.74 
Rum. X Effort  -.80* -2.33   -.39 -1.11 
Ang. X Effort  .43 1.10   .06 0.16 
* p < .05, ** p <.001 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Interpretation of Findings 
 The purpose this study was to examine the relationship between anger rumination, 
provocation, and aggression in two conditions: one condition requiring a low level of 
effort to aggress and one condition requiring a high level of effort to aggress. It was 
hypothesized that a) participants in the high effort condition would respond with less 
aggression despite provocation; b) higher levels of anger rumination would uniquely 
increase aggressive responding in the high effort group over and above the effects of trait 
anger; and c) trait anger would be positively associated with aggressive responding in the 
low-effort condition controlling for trait anger, especially under high levels of 
provocation.  
In order to test these hypotheses, anger rumination was measured using the 
Dissipation-Rumination Scale, a continuous self-report measure of anger rumination. 
This scale was validated via a two step multiple regression analysis incorporating a 
measure of trait anger, and then two other scales related to anger rumination. Results of 
this regression indicated qualified support for the validity of the DRS, with subscales 
measuring anger rumination and revenge planning predicting a significant amount of the 
variance in DRS scores over and above the effects of trait anger. 
 Aggression was measured via two indices: mean level of electric shock selected 
by participants and by the number of level 20 shocks selected by participants. Data were 
analyzed using a series of eight multiple regression analyses, examining the relationships 
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among variables independent of provocation, within provocation blocks, and at each level 
of provocation separately.    
 Hypothesis 1 was supported in all analyses using the mean shock index. 
Requiring increasing effort to aggress caused a significant reduction in mean shock 
independent of provocation, within provocation blocks, and at low and high levels of 
provocation.  However, hypothesis 1 was only partially supported using total 20 shocks 
as an aggression index. Independent of provocation, effort group membership closely 
approached  statistical significance, but no significant effect was found within 
provocation blocks. Results were similarly mixed at each provocation level. There was no 
effect for effort group membership at the low provocation level, whereas high effort 
group membership decreased the number of 20 shocks selected under high provocation.  
 Hypothesis 2 was not fully supported using either shock index. Across shock 
indices, higher levels of anger rumination were found to promote higher levels of 
aggression independent of provocation, and a similar aggression-promoting effect was 
noted in both low and high provocation conditions. However, anger rumination was not 
found to significantly affect the difference in aggression between low and high 
provocation blocks. Also unsupported was the postulated relationship among aggression, 
rumination, and effort condition postulated in hypothesis 2. Rumination was not found to 
increase or maintain aggression in the high-effort condition and, moreover, was not found 
to moderate the relationship between effort condition and aggression in any of the 
regressions.  
 Hypothesis 3 was unsupported. Trait anger was not a significant predictor of 
aggression at high levels of provocation or in any of the other regression models. 
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Additionally, there was no significant interaction noted between trait anger and effort 
condition. It is unclear why trait anger was not a significant predictor of aggression in any 
of the regression models, given the theoretical association between anger and aggression. 
It is possible that there was not a wide enough range in anger among participants in this 
study. Levels of trait anger among study participants were generally skewed leftward, 
suggesting relatively low levels of anger. The affect on aggression may have been more 
profound had more individuals identified severe or pathological levels of anger.  
 The above findings further support the aggression dampening effect of the 
required effort condition noted in Broman-Fulks and colleagues (2008) persisted in this 
current study as well, although more dramatically when mean shock was the aggression 
index. This effect appeared robust enough to overcome the aggression promoting effects 
of both provocation and anger rumination; although it should be noted that anger 
rumination did promote aggressive behavior. This is consistent with previous 
rumination/aggression research (Bushman et al., 2005; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller 
2006).  
The aggression decreasing effect of required effort was more questionable when 
the number of 20 shocks selected was used as an aggression index. Effort group 
membership was not entirely predictive of 20 shocks selected in the DV1 condition and 
not at all predictive of total 20 shocks selected in the DV2 condition. Group membership 
was also not predictive of aggression in the low provocation block, but was significantly 
predictive in the high provocation block. This finding could be accounted for by the 
general rarity of the selection of the 20 shock at the low provocation level, with only 
9.8% of participants selecting a 20 shock in this block of trials. In contrast to this, a 
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significant aggression-decreasing effect was noted for group membership at the high 
provocation level, at which 30.1% of participants, having been repeatedly provoked by 
the opponent, selected 20 shocks. This suggests that there may be something different 
about the subset of participants who elected to set 20 shocks preemptively (i.e. prior to 
being provoked). These participants may not react in the same way to being required to 
exert effort to aggress as those who set 20 shocks following provocation. 
Also of note was the role, or lack thereof, of gender in predicting aggressive 
behavior. Gender was only found to account for a unique portion of variance in 
aggression when low-provocation group mean shocks were regressed onto the 3 step 
regression model. This is consistent with Bettencourt and Miller’s (1996) research on 
gender and aggression, as male/female differences in aggression tend to disappear 
following a provocation. The lack of gender effects in other low provocation/provocation 
independent analyses could be accounted for by the relatively uneven balance of genders 
(33% males vs. 67% females).  
Contrary to expectations, increased ruminative thought did not promote increased 
aggression on the TAP in the high effort condition. There are several possible 
explanations for this finding. As noted above, the inconvenience of the high effort 
manipulation may have simply overcome any added perseveration promoted by higher 
levels of rumination. It is also possible that the perseveration that characterizes 
ruminative thought (e.g., repeatedly focusing on anger-provoking situations, not allowing 
angry feelings to dissipate over time) is markedly different from the kind of perseverative 
behavior that would result in a study participant continually responding to an effortful 
task. In other words, although high ruminators may continue to think perseveratively 
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about their anger, and even aggress more readily and intensely, they may not perseverate 
behaviorally in order to aggress. Additionally, it is also possible that the cover task: a test 
of reaction time was itself distracting enough to dissipate some of the angry rumination, 
although this is unlikely, given the competitive nature of the task and the frequent 
provocation shocks from the supposed opponent. 
 The finding that membership in the high-effort group decreases aggressive 
responding was clearly established through the above analyses. What is somewhat less 
clear is the “active ingredient” in the high-effort condition that resulted in this decrease. 
This paper has conceptualized “effort” as causing the decrease, but it is also possible that 
the decrease in selected shock could be the result of the increased time required to 
respond. High effort condition participants who selected all, or nearly all, 20 shocks 
invested a comparatively larger amount of time in the TAP (up to 40 minutes) than those 
who selected lower shocks (~20 minutes). Part of the decrease in aggression due to the 
high-effort condition could represent participants not only finding the repetitive task 
aversive or boring, but also wanting to complete the study as quickly as possible in order 
to attend to other engagements. This may have been especially true during the high 
provocation block, which was presented during the second half of the TAP’s 28 trials.  
Questions also remain about the universality of the aggression-dampening effects 
observed in this study. A variety of antecedents of aggressive behavior exist, DSM-IV 
TR (APA, 2000), for example, lists identifies pathological anger, irritability, or 
potentially aggressive behavior as associated features of a variety of different psychiatric 
disorders (e.g., Bipolar Disorder, Conduct Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, 
Intermittent Explosive Disorder). Additionally, alcohol intoxication or other disinhibiting 
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stimuli can also serve as precursors to aggression (McCloskey & Berman, 2003). 
Requiring high levels of effort could potentially be more or less effective in decreasing 
aggressive behavior depending on the antecedent to aggression. Consider, for example, 
disorders in which aggressive responding is associated with impulsivity such as Bipolar 
Disorder or Intermittent Explosive Disorder. Theoretically, individuals with these 
diagnoses could potentially be more affected by the high effort-condition manipulation, 
either due to dissipation of the impulsive aggression, or through the impulsive selection 
of a more easily obtained low level shock. A similar effect would be expected in 
participants in a substance-induced state of disinhibition. Conversely, individuals who 
engage in more planful, instrumental aggressive behavior, (e.g., Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, Conduct Disorder) may be less affected by effort manipulations. Further 
research into these variations could help to further refine the understanding of the 
relationship between aggression and required effort.  
Potential Contributions of the Current Study 
One central question in interpreting the above results is how applicable these 
findings are to real-world aggression compared to aggression as measured in the 
laboratory by the TAP. Although the use of a laboratory paradigm does limit the study’s 
ecological validity, the finding that denying easy access to a means to aggression tends to 
lower aggression does have applications to a variety of real world issues. Perhaps the 
prototypical example is gun control legislation, in which interventions such as a waiting 
periods or background checks, create situations in which potential firearm buyers must 
exert significant effort in order to access a weapon. The effectiveness of requiring an 
exertion of effort to aggress in decreasing aggressive responding, regardless of factors 
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such as tendency to ruminate on anger, provocation, or increased aggression, would 
appear to support the theoretical soundness of such interventions.  
 These findings have clinical implications in addition to the aforementioned public 
policy implications. Uncontrolled, pathological anger has been implicated as an 
antecedent to aggressive behavior (Bettencourt et al., 2006).  This study’s findings could 
support and inform treatment or risk management for psychiatric disorders associated 
with pathological anger, irritability, or aggression. Such interventions could include 
determining whether or not patients who are at risk to aggress own or have access to 
weapons; and negotiating, either with patients or family members, to make access more 
restricted or difficult (e.g., unloading guns, gun locks, locking knife drawers, etc). As 
discussed above, these interventions may be more successful with patients who 
experience aggressive behavior related to impulsivity.  
 Other contributions of the current study include the design of a novel paradigm 
for the induction of anger in the laboratory. Although previous studies have used negative 
feedback as a means of anger provocation previously, this study is the first to integrate 
that feedback into a laboratory paradigm of aggression measurement. This study also 
contributed to the body of evidence validating the Dissipation-Rumination Scale as a 
valid measurement of anger rumination. 
Limitations of the Current Study 
 A central limitation of the current study was the complexity and conventions of 
the provocation cover task and anger rumination induction. In order for data from a given 
participant to usable, that participant was be required to believe both that they were 
competing against another, provoking individual, and that they were not involved in a 
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task measuring aggression. Given the subject pool, undergraduate psychology students, 
many participants were able to guess, at least partially, the true purpose of the study. This 
required the rejection of a larger than average number of participants (27), lowering 
power.  
 Another limitation involved the nature of the available anger rumination 
measures. The measures of anger rumination used in this study asked essentially 
retrospective questions about participants’ anger rumination experiences (e.g., “I have 
had times when I could not stop being pre-occupied with a particular 
conflict”[Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001]). However, these measures do not 
measure current anger rumination in vivo. Although there was a manipulation check in 
this study to measure anger, the current study’s design did not provide for an opportunity 
to include a manipulation check for the occurrence of rumination itself.   
Future Research and Possible Variations 
The high-effort/low-effort modification of the Taylor Aggression Paradigm is a 
promising area of potential future research. Other potential moderating variables 
including psychopathy could be explored using the same, or similar, research design. As 
previously mentioned, this relationship may function differently depending on the 
antecedents of aggressive behavior. A study comparing impulsive aggressors to 
instrumental aggressors using the high/low effort TAP could provide further information 
on the nature of factors affecting the relationship between aggression and effort 
condition. This research study could resemble the current study but incorporate a reward-
based system in order to provoke instrumental aggression. 
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Additionally, in order to address the above-noted lack of an in vivo measure of 
rumination, a longitudinal component could be added to future aggression/anger 
rumination studies in order to better capture the long-term nature of anger rumination. 
Participants could be provoked via verbal insult and then invited back the following day 
at which time their level of anger would be assessed. This would give some idea of which 
individuals were actually ruminating. Alternatively, a periodic measure of anger during 
the task could be built into the SAP protocol, which would also better measure 
rumination in vivo. This could also involve further refining and testing the anger 
induction paradigm developed for this study (e.g., further testing of provocative language 
in order to maximize anger-induction while maintaining believability). A future study 
could incorporate continuous real-time feedback from the supposed participant (or an 
actual confederate) in order to continue to activate anger-related thoughts and feelings. 
Finally, given some of the questions about the connection between the perseverative 
nature of ruminative thought and perseverative behavior, research could be conducted 
further examining the effects of anger rumination on executive functioning.   This could 
begin with some initial analyses of Wisconsin Card Sorting Test data collected during the 
provocation induction.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship among anger 
rumination, provocation, and aggressive behavior under two conditions: one requiring 
significant effort to aggress and one in which aggression required little to no effort. The 
main finding was that although anger rumination was associated with aggression, 
requiring significant effort in order to aggress decreased aggressive responding as 
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measured by mean shock even at high levels of provocation, trait anger, and anger 
rumination.   
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APPENDIX A 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI 
 
CONSENT DOCUMENT FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
TITLE OF STUDY: PERSONALITY MATCHING AND JOINT PERFORMANCE ON 
A REACTION TIME TASK 
 
PARTICIPANT NAME __________________________________________________ 
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?  The purpose of this study is to obtain a 
better understanding of how personality similarities affect a person’s reaction time during 
an interactive game.  If you agree to be in this study, you may be asked to answer some 
questions about your feelings and memories, be exposed to electrical stimuli, perform 
some tasks, and answer questions in response to your performance on these tasks.  This 
study is part of a doctoral dissertation by Joshua Bullock M.A., and Dr. Mitchell Berman 
is supervising the project. 
 
WHAT WILL I DO? You will take part in a reaction time task that involves the use of 
mild to moderate electrical stimulation (electric shock). You will take part in twenty-
eight individual reaction time trials against another participant each of which may end 
with you receiving electrical stimulation. The highest possible shock that you can receive 
may be unpleasant or painful, and should your partner choose to select an extreme shock, 
you may experience some tissue damage which should heal quickly. You will also 
perform some other tasks that resemble card games or line tracing. You will also be asked 
to complete a number of questions about your feelings and behaviors. The entire study 
will take about one hour or a bit longer to complete. If you have recently used marijuana 
or a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (e.g., Lexapro, Celexa, Paxil, Prozac etc.) you 
cannot participate in this study. 
 
WHAT ARE THE RISKS TO ME? Risks inherent in this study are minimal. You may 
experience mild to moderate discomfort from the electrical stimulation used in the 
attention task. If your partner chooses to select an extreme shock (20), you may 
experience some minor tissue damage which should heal quickly. You may get bored or 
tired during the sessions. Some questions may be sensitive in nature. For example, we 
will ask you about feelings and emotions you may have had in the past. You may feel 
uneasy after answering these questions. 
 
WHO BENEFITS? The information obtained in this study will not directly benefit you. 
However, the results of the study may provide information about human personality and 
reaction time.  
 
You will receive course credit for being in the study. You will receive four points of 
Experimetrix credit for your participation. If you do not meet the criteria for this study, or 
you choose not to participate, other research options for obtaining credit are available. 
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Credit may also be obtained through non-research options at your course instructor’s 
discretion.  You may prefer to discuss other options for obtaining credit with your 
instructor. 
 
WHO WILL SEE MY INFORMATION? All information obtained during this study is 
confidential. That is, we protect the privacy of subjects by withholding their names and 
other identifying information from all persons not connected with this study. All 
information will be kept in a locked file cabinet or on an access-controlled computer. 
Data that we may report in scientific journals will not include any information that 
identifies you as a subject in this study. Five years after the final publication of this study, 
all study information will be destroyed.  
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. 
You may withdraw from being a research subject anytime, even after we tell you about 
the study. There is no penalty for withdrawing at any time. If you withdraw from this 
study voluntarily, you will receive course credit only for those aspects of the research that 
you have completed. Students here receive one “research credit” for each half-hour of 
participation. If you decide to not participate, you will receive one-half credit. If you stop 
after a half hour, you will receive one credit. If you finish the study, you will receive four 
credits for over 90 minutes of participation. Please keep your copy of this consent form 
for your records. 
 
PARTICIPANT'S CONSENT. I have had the purposes and procedures of this study 
explained to me and have had the opportunity to ask questions. My questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction, and I am voluntarily signing this form. My signature shows 
my willingness to participate in this study under the conditions stated. If I have questions 
about this research study, I can contact Joshua Bullock or Mitchell E. Berman, Ph.D., at 
(601) 266-6509 In addition, if I have further questions about my rights as a participant in 
this research protocol, I understand that I may contact the Office of Research and 
Sponsored Programs at (601) 266-4119.   
 
 
_______________________ _______ _______________________ _______ 
Participant's Signature       Date  Investigator's Signature Date   
 
 
_______________________ _______ 
Witness to Signature    Date  
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APPENDIX B 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Subject Number: __________  Date: ___/___/___ 
 
Age            __________ 
 
Gender: _____Male 
 _____Female 
 
 
Ethnic Group:  _____Caucasian 
  _____African-American 
  _____Hispanic 
  _____Other (specify ________________________) 
 
 
 
Highest academic degree? __________________________________________________ 
 
Current occupation? _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please circle “Yes” or “No” for the following questions. If you answer yes, please 
describe in further detail in the space provided. 
Are you currently taking any medication? 
Yes No 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder (e.g., Schizophrenia)? 
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Yes No 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________  
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with panic disorder or another anxiety disorder? 
Yes No 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 Have you ever been diagnosed with bipolar disorder? 
Yes No 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________  
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Post Task Questionnaire 
Participant #: _______ 
 
 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. IF YOU DO NOT KNOW AN 
ANSWER PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST GUESS. 
 
1. Were you following any system with regard to the reaction-time key (e.g., were  
you pulling your finger up or to the side, etc.)? Please write a brief sentence. 
 
 
2. Was it important for you to win? 
 
Not at All 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
 
3. Compared to most participants, how high were the shocks you set for your 
opponent  
(circle one statement only). 
 
    a. I set much lower shocks than most people in the study 
   b. I set somewhat lower shocks than most people in the study 
 c. I set the same shocks as most people in the study 
 d. I set somewhat higher shocks than most people in the study 
e. I set much higher shocks than most people in the study 
 
 
4. Compared to most participants, how high were the shocks you set for your 
opponent  
(circle one statement only). 
 
    a. I set much lower shocks than most people in the study 
   b. I set somewhat lower shocks than most people in the study 
 c. I set the same shocks as most people in the study 
 d. I set somewhat higher shocks than most people in the study 
e. I set much higher shocks than most people in the study 
  
 
5. Why did you choose the shock settings you did? Please explain. 
 
 
 
6. How much did you feel in control of the situation? 
 
Not at All 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
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7. How anxious were you during the task? 
 
Not at All 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
 
8. How concerned were you with what the experimenter thought of you?  
 
  Not at All 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
 
9. How concerned were you with what your opponent thought of you?  
 
  Not at All 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
 
 
10.  How important is it for you to know your opponent? 
 
Not at All 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
 
11. How painful was the highest shock you took during the threshold procedure?  
 
  Not at All  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
 
 
12.  How much tissue damage do you think the 20 shock causes? 
 
None   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
 
          
13. If you did not receive a 20, how painful would you expect a 20 to be? 
 
Not Painful   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  Extremely Painful 
 
 
14. Did you know anything about this experiment before you participated (other than 
what  
the experimenter told you on the phone)? Please explain: 
 
 
15.  As best as you can recall, your opponent was: Male_____ Female_____ 
 
16. Your best guess about your opponent’s age:  ______ years old 
 
17.    How much did you feel your opponent was provoking you? 
 
  Not at All  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 Very Much 
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18. What do you think the purpose of this study is? 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SETTING SHOCK THRESHOLD 
 
“Okay Subjects A and B, I’m going to turn on the microphone so that we can all hear 
each other.” 
 
“First, I will give you a series of shocks, increasing the intensity of each one. When the 
shock is first presented, it will be below your threshold and you will NOT feel it. As the 
intensity increases: first, you will become aware of it; second, it will feel like a tingling 
sensation; third, it will feel like a vibration; and finally, the shock will reach an intensity 
that is definitely painful. I want you to tell me two things: one, report when you first feel 
the shock, and two, report when you don’t want anymore, that is, when it is 
DEFINITELY painful.” 
 
“Okay Subject A, let’s begin with you. Tell me when you first feel the shock.”  
(pause for Subject A Response) 
“Okay, Subject A, now tell me when you don’t want anymore, that is, when the shock 
becomes very unpleasant. I will stop the upper threshold procedure when you tell me the 
shock is VERY unpleasant—that is, when you can’t take anymore. PLEASE wait to stop 
until the shock is painful.”  
(Pause for Subject A Response) 
“Okay Subject A, we’ll stop there”. 
 
“Okay Subject B, it’s your turn. Tell me when you first feel the shock.” 
(Play Subject B Sound File) 
“Okay, now tell me when you don’t want anymore, that is, when the shock becomes 
VERY unpleasant. I will stop the upper threshold procedure when you tell me the shock 
is very unpleasant. PLEASE wait to stop until the shock is painful.” 
(Play Subject B Sound File) 
“Okay Subject B we’ll stop there”. 
 
Low Effort TAP Instructions 
"Okay Subject A and B. We’ll do the task now. The purpose of this task is to determine 
the effect of personality matching on the speed with which a finger can be pulled off a 
reaction time key—the space bar on the computer. Two of you, situated in separate 
rooms, will be competing against each other to see who has the fastest reaction time. 
Both of you have the same apparatus in front of you and the same task to perform.  
 
You will see the instructions “Wait, Get Ready, Hold Spacebar, and Release” on the 
computer screen. When the computer says to Hold Spacebar, you are to press and hold 
down the space bar. When the release signal comes on the screen, you are to remove your 
finger from the space bar as fast as you can. Of course, you both will receive the release 
signal at the same time. The object of each trial is to get your finger off the space bar as 
fast as possible in order to beat your competitor. 
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The person who does not get his/her finger off in the shortest time, that is, the person 
with the slower reaction time, will receive a shock. There are 12 different intensities of 
shock you can receive if you have the slower reaction time: 0 through 10 and a 20. The 
degree of shock you actually receive depends upon the degree of shock your opponent 
chooses to store in the apparatus before the trial begins.” 
 
“Before each trial, when you see the instructions to choose a shock, you will immediately 
set the amount of shock you wish your opponent to receive if you should be faster on the 
coming trial. You will do this by briefly pressing, just once, one of the 12 buttons at the 
top of the keyboard. The 1-button corresponds to the least intense shock possible. The 10-
button corresponds to the shock level each of you judged most unpleasant during the 
preliminary trials. The 20-button will administer an EXTREMELY PAINFUL shock 
twice the intensity of the shock each of you judged most unpleasant in the preliminary 
trials. This shock may cause minor tissue damage that will quickly heal, but will have no 
permanent effects. If you press the 0-button, NO shock will be delivered.” 
 
“After you have set the amount of shock you wish your opponent to receive on the 
coming trial, the actual trial will begin. You will see the signal to press the reaction-time 
key. At some time after this, the release signal will flash and you are to remove your 
finger as fast as possible. At the end of each trial you will be informed by a message on 
the computer screen about the level of shock set by the other person as well as whether 
you won or lost the particular trial. The slower person will get a shock of the intensity 
that was chosen by the other person. The faster person will not receive the shock that was 
set by the other person. If either of you lift your finger off the space bar before the release 
signal comes on, a message saying ‘Subject released space bar too soon’ will come on 
and the two of you will repeat the trial. 
 
“To summarize: When the signal comes on, you are to briefly set the amount of shock 
you wish your competitor to receive if (he/she) should be slower on the coming trial. You 
will then press the space bar down and hold it down when signaled, until the 'release' 
signal flashes. At this time, you are to remove your finger as fast as possible. The slower 
person on that trial will receive the shock set by (his/her) competitor. The faster person 
will not receive the shock, but will see the level of shock set for them by their opponent 
via a message on the computer screen. It is important that both of you set the shock level 
as soon as instructed, and respond to the release signal AS FAST AS YOU CAN.” 
 
Okay, I am going to turn on the computer monitors for both of you, and we’ll start the 
task. Give me a ‘thumbs up’ if you can see your monitor.” 
 
High Effort TAP Instructions – Differences are in bold. 
"Okay Subject A and B. We’ll do the task now. The purpose of this task is to determine 
the effect of personality matching on the speed with which a finger can be pulled off a 
reaction time key—the space bar on the computer. Two of you, situated in separate 
rooms, will be competing against each other to see who has the fastest reaction time. 
Both of you have the same apparatus in front of you and the same task to perform.  
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You will see the instructions “Wait, Get Ready, Hold Spacebar, and Release” on the 
computer screen. When the computer says to Hold Spacebar, you are to press and hold 
down the space bar. When the release signal comes on the screen, you are to remove your 
finger from the space bar as fast as you can. Of course, you both will receive the release 
signal at the same time. The object of each trial is to get your finger off the space bar as 
fast as possible in order to beat your competitor. 
 
The person who does not get his/her finger off in the shortest time, that is, the person 
with the slower reaction time, will receive a shock. There are 12 different intensities of 
shock you can receive if you have the slower reaction time: 0 through 10 and a 20. The 
degree of shock you actually receive depends upon the degree of shock your opponent 
chooses to store in the apparatus before the trial begins.” 
 
“Before each trial, when you see the instructions to choose a shock, you will set the level 
of shock you wish your opponent to receive if you should be faster on the coming trial. 
You will do this by briefly pressing, just once, one of the 12 buttons at the top of the 
keyboard. The 1-button corresponds to the least intense shock possible. The 10-button 
corresponds to the shock level each of you judged most unpleasant during the preliminary 
trials. The 20-button will administer an EXTREMELY PAINFUL shock twice the 
intensity of the shock each of you judged most unpleasant in the preliminary trials. This 
shock may cause minor tissue damage that will quickly heal, but will have no permanent 
effects. If you press the 0-button, NO shock will be delivered. On the computer screen, 
you will see a display indicating which shocks are available for you to select. You 
will notice that, to begin with, only the 0 button will be available. In order to select 
higher shocks you must continue pressing the space bar until the shock you would 
like to select becomes available. Once it does, you may press one the corresponding 
button on the top of the keyboard to select it.” 
 
“After you have set the amount of shock you wish your opponent to receive on the 
coming trial, the actual trial will begin. You will see the signal to press the reaction-time 
key. At some time after this, the release signal will flash and you are to remove your 
finger as fast as possible. At the end of each trial you will be informed by a message on 
the computer screen about the level of shock set by the other person as well as whether 
you won or lost the particular trial. The slower person will get a shock of the intensity 
that was chosen by the other person. The faster person will not receive the shock that was 
set by the other person. If either of you lift your finger off the space bar before the release 
signal comes on, a message saying ‘Subject released space bar too soon’ will come on 
and the two of you will repeat the trial. 
 
“To summarize: When the signal comes on, you are to briefly set the amount of shock 
you wish your competitor to receive if (he/she) should be slower on the coming trial. If 
you wish to select a shock higher than 0, you must continue to press the space bar 
until your desired shock becomes available on the screen. After you set the shock, you 
will then press the space bar down and hold it down when signaled, until the 'release' 
signal flashes. At this time, you are to remove your finger as fast as possible. The slower 
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person on that trial will receive the shock set by (his/her) competitor. The faster person 
will not receive the shock, but will see the level of shock set for them by their opponent 
via a message on the computer screen. It is important that both of you set the shock level 
as soon as instructed, and respond to the release signal AS FAST AS YOU CAN.” 
 
Okay, I am going to turn on the computer monitors for both of you, and we’ll start the 
task. Give me a ‘thumbs up’ if you can see your monitor. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FORM 
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